CERT home
vulnerabilities & fixesevaluations & practicesresearch & analysistraining & education
homesearchFAQsite indexcontact
Vulnerability
Notes
Database

Search Vulnerability Notes

Vulnerability Notes Help Information
 

 View Notes By
Name

ID Number

CVE Name

Date Public

Date Published

Date Updated

Severity Metric

Vulnerability Note VU#115112

Sun Solaris catman creates temporary files insecurely

Overview

catman, the unix manual display utility, creates insecure temporary files with predictable names in a world-writable directory. Since catman executes with system administration privileges, a symbolic link attack could overwrite arbitrary files.

I. Description

There is a vulnerability in catman that allows attackers to overwrite arbitrary files, regardless of ownership. The catman program creates temporary files with predictable names and paths such as /tmp/sman_pidofcatman. By monitoring the process ids (PID) of currently running processes, attackers can predict the next PID to be assigned, which will allow them to predict the filename. Once the filename is established, the attacker then creates a symbolic link from the temporary file to the file they want to overwrite. Because the catman program runs as root, it is able to overwrite the file targeted by the symbolic link.

II. Impact

Attackers can exploit the predictability of catman temporary filenames to overwrite arbitrary system files, regardless of ownership.

III. Solution

The CERT/CC is currently unaware of a practical solution to this problem.

Systems Affected

VendorStatusDate Updated
SunVulnerable26-Sep-2001

References


http://xforce.iss.net/static/5788.php

Credit

This vulnerability was first described by Larry W. Cashdollar.

This document was last modified by Tim Shimeall.

Other Information

Date Public01/30/2001
Date First Published09/27/2001 02:21:04 PM
Date Last Updated09/27/2001
CERT Advisory 
CVE NameCAN-2001-0095
Metric12.60
Document Revision13

If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
 

Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University