The OpenPKG Project Information for VU#229595

Overly large OPT record assertion

Status

Affected

Vendor Statement

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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@openpkg.org                         openpkg@openpkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2002.011                                          15-Nov-2002
________________________________________________________________________

Package:             bind, bind8
Vulnerability:       denial of service, arbitrary code execution
OpenPKG Specific:    no

Dependent Packages:  none

Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:     Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG 1.0          <= bind-8.2.6-1.0.1    >= bind-8.2.6-1.0.2
OpenPKG 1.1          <= bind8-8.3.3-1.1.0   >= bind8-8.3.3-1.1.1
OpenPKG CURRENT      <= bind8-8.3.3-2002082 >= bind8-8.3.3-20021114

Description:
 The Internet Software Consortium (ISC) [1] has discovered or has been
 notified of several bugs which can result in vulnerabilities of varying
 levels of severity in BIND [2][3]. These problems include buffer overflows,
 stack revealing, divide by zero, null pointer dereferencing, and more [4].
 A subset of these vulnerabilities exist in the BIND packages distributed by
 OpenPKG.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -qa |
 grep bind". If you have an affected version of the "bind" or "bind8" package
 (see above), upgrade it according to the solution below.

Workaround:
 Because disabling recursion or disabling DNSSEC is a workaround to only a
 subset of the aforementioned problems, it is not a recommended aproach.

Solution:
 Since these vulnerabilities do not exist in BIND version 9.2.1, one solution
 simply involves upgrading to it. The packages bind-9.2.1-1.1.0 in OpenPKG
 1.1 [5], and bind-9.2.1-20021111 in OpenPKG CURRENT [6] are both candidates
 in this respect. Be warned that although such later versions of BIND are
 stable, there exist large differences between BIND 8 and BIND 9 software.

  A lighter approach involves updating existing packages to newly patched
 versions of BIND 8. Select the updated source RPM appropriate
 for your OpenPKG release [7][8][9], and fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service
 or a mirror location. Verify its integrity [10], build a corresponding
 binary RPM from it and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
 binary RPM [11]. For the latest OpenPKG 1.1 release, perform the following
 operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases
 adjust accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
 ftp> bin
 ftp> cd release/1.1/UPD
 ftp> get bind8-8.3.3-1.1.1.src.rpm
 ftp> bye
 $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig bind8-8.3.3-1.1.1.src.rpm
 $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild bind8-8.3.3-1.1.1.src.rpm
 $ su -
 # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/bind8-8.3.3-1.1.1.*.rpm
 # <prefix>/etc/rc bind8 stop start
________________________________________________________________________

References:
 [1]  
http://www.isc.org/
 [2]  
http://www.isc.org/products/BIND/
 [3]  
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-31.html
 [4]  
http://www.isc.org/products/BIND/bind-security.html
 [5]  
ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/SRC/bind-9.2.1-1.1.0.src.rpm
 [6]  
ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/current/SRC/bind-9.2.1-20021111.src.rpm
 [7]  
ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.0/UPD/bind-8.2.6-1.0.2.src.rpm
 [8]  
ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/bind8-8.3.3-1.1.1.src.rpm
 [9]  
ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/current/SRC/bind8-8.3.3-20021114.src.rpm
 [10]
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
 [11]
http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with
the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F)
of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL
http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To
check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by
using GnuPG (
http://www.gnupg.org/). For example, pipe this message to
the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
________________________________________________________________________

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Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Vendor References

None

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

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