Various RADIUS servers and clients permit the passing of vendor-specific and user-specific attributes. Several implementations of RADIUS fail to check the Vendor-Length of the Vendor-Specific attribute. It's possible to cause a denial of service against RADIUS servers with a malformed Vendor-Specific attribute.
RADIUS servers and clients fail to validate the Vendor-Length inside Vendor-Specific attributes. The Vendor-Length shouldn't be less than 2. If Vendor-Length is less than 2, the RADIUS server (or client) calculates the attribute length as a negative number. The attribute length is then used in various functions. In most RADIUS servers the function that performs this calculation is rad_recv() or radrecv(). Some applications may use the same logic to validate user-specific attributes and be vulnerable via the same method. For example, YARDRadius contains this vulnerability in the handling of the User-Specific attributes only.
It is possible to cause a denial of service against the RADIUS server with a malformed Vendor-Specific attribute. Though unlikely, if a RADIUS client processes the Vendor-Specific attribute contained in a server response, then the client may also be vulnerable.
Apply a patch or upgrade to the version specified by your vendor.
Open System Consultants
Secure Computing Corporation
Wind River Systems
Our thanks to 3APA3A <3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU> for the report and analysis of this vulnerability.
This document was written by Jason Rafail and is based on information provided by 3APA3A.