Apple Not Affected

Notified:  October 24, 2001 Updated: October 25, 2001

Status

Not Affected

Vendor Statement

Mac OS X and Mac OS X Server are not vulnerable.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

BSDI Not Affected

Updated:  November 12, 2001

Status

Not Affected

Vendor Statement

No statement is currently available from the vendor regarding this vulnerability.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

Caldera Not Affected

Notified:  October 24, 2001 Updated: October 25, 2001

Status

Not Affected

Vendor Statement

We are not using a SystemV based /bin/login, we are using the BSD originated rlogin tools. All OpenLinux products are 'Not Vulnerable'.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

Cisco Affected

Updated:  April 11, 2002

Status

Affected

Vendor Statement

See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/Solaris-bin-login.shtml

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

Compaq Computer Corporation Not Affected

Updated:  November 12, 2001

Status

Not Affected

Vendor Statement

Compaq's Tru64 Software is not impacted by this reported problem.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

Cray Not Affected

Updated:  November 12, 2001

Status

Not Affected

Vendor Statement

Cray Inc. has determined that its implementation of login is not vulnerable to the situation described in VU#569272.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

Hewlett Packard Affected

Notified:  October 24, 2001 Updated: December 19, 2001

Status

Affected

Vendor Statement

HP-UX is NOT Exploitable. It is NOT a security issue with HP-UX. HP-UX does have a benign buffer overflow which is the only reason HP-UX is listed as "effected" above. In any case, the buffer overflow has been fixed by HP.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

We have confirmed with Hewlett-Packard that the flaw is present. Hewlett-Packard has indicated that they were unable to develop an exploit for this flaw, however, we do not believe that this is sufficient evidence to conclude that HP systems are not vulnerable.

IBM Affected

Notified:  October 24, 2001 Updated: December 21, 2001

Status

Affected

Vendor Statement

IBM's AIX operating system, versions 4.3 and 5.1, are susceptible to this vulnerability. We have prepared an emergency fix ("efix"), "tsmlogin_efix.tar.Z", and it is available for downloading from: ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security The APAR assignment for AIX 5.1 is IY26221. The APAR for AIX 4.3 is IY26443. Both will be available soon. The "README" file at the above FTP site will be updated to provide the official fix information and availability. Update: Incomplete installation instructions were included in the first posting of the efix on Wednesday, 12 December 2001. The installation instructions were rewritten and tarballed with the efixes. The efix tarball was then reposted to the FTP download site on the afternoon of Thursday, 13 December. An amended advisory reflecting the correct instructions has also been issued. Customers may wish to consult the amended advisory, or download the most recent efix, to obtain the new instructions. IBM is developing an emergency fix for AIX 4.2.1 at Maintenance Level 06 (the last ML done). Also, we are developing efixes for AIX 4.3.3 at maintenance levels 06 and 08.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

MandrakeSoft Not Affected

Notified:  October 24, 2001 Updated: December 12, 2001

Status

Not Affected

Vendor Statement

We have not received a statement from the vendor.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

NCR Unknown

Updated:  January 07, 2002

Status

Unknown

Vendor Statement

No statement is currently available from the vendor regarding this vulnerability.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

NetBSD Not Affected

Updated:  November 12, 2001

Status

Not Affected

Vendor Statement

NetBSD does not use a System V derived login, and therefore, NetBSD is not vulnerable.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

Red Hat Not Affected

Notified:  October 24, 2001 Updated: October 24, 2001

Status

Not Affected

Vendor Statement

Red Hat Linux does not use a System V derived /bin/login, and is therefore not vulnerable to this.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

SCO Affected

Notified:  October 24, 2001 Updated: December 14, 2001

Status

Affected

Vendor Statement

Caldera International, Inc. Security Advisory Subject: OpenServer: /bin/login and /etc/getty argument buffer overflow Advisory number: CSSA-2001-SCO.40 Issue date: 2001 December 14 Cross reference: 1. Problem Description A remotely exploitable buffer overflow exists in /bin/login and /etc/getty. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to gain root access to the server. 2. Vulnerable Versions Operating System Version Affected Files OpenServer <= 5.0.6a /bin/login /etc/getty 3. Workaround None. 4. OpenServer 4.1 Location of Fixed Binaries ftp://stage.caldera.com/pub/security/openserver/CSSA-2001-SCO.40/ erg711877.506.tar.Z is the patch for SCO OpenServer Release 5.0.6, with or without Release Supplement 5.0.6a (rs506a). Note that other security issues are corrected by rs506a; we strongly recommend installing it on all 5.0.6 systems. erg711877.505.tar.Z is the patch for SCO OpenServer Release 5.0.5 and earlier. Although it should work with all releases 5.0.0 through 5.0.5, it has not yet been tested on every release. 4.2 Verification md5 checksums: e1748ebb4710796620c15017e52eecc0 erg711877.505.tar.Z 627a41d22040872f967cb5387c7e629c erg711877.506.tar.Z md5 is available for download from ftp://stage.caldera.com/pub/security/tools/ 4.3 Installing Fixed Binaries Upgrade the affected binaries with the following commands: For 5.0.6 and 5.0.6a: Download erg711877.506.tar.Z to the /tmp directory # mv /bin/login /bin/login- # mv /etc/getty /etc/getty- # chmod 0 /bin/login- /etc/getty- # uncompress erg711877.506.tar.Z # cd / # tar xvf /tmp/erg711877.506.tar For pre-5.0.6: Download erg711877.505.tar.Z to the /tmp directory # mv /bin/login /bin/login- # mv /etc/getty /etc/getty- # chmod 0 /bin/login- /etc/getty- # uncompress erg711877.505.tar.Z # cd / # tar xvf /tmp/erg711877.505.tar 5. References http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-34.html http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/569272 http://xforce.iss.net/alerts/advise105.php This and other advisories are located at http://stage.caldera.com/support/security This advisory addresses Caldera Security internal incidents sr854610, SCO-559-1318, erg711877. 6. Disclaimer Caldera International, Inc. is not responsible for the misuse of any of the information we provide on our website and/or through our security advisories. Our advisories are a service to our customers intended to promote secure installation and use of Caldera International products. 7. Acknowledgements This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Mark Dowd of the ISS X-Force.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

SGI Affected

Updated:  December 18, 2001

Status

Affected

Vendor Statement

SGI Security Advisory Title: Buffer Overflow in System V Derived Login Number: 20011201-01-I Reference: CERT® Advisory CA-2001-34 Date: December 17, 2001 SGI provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. SGI recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. SGI provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall SGI be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. --- Issue Specifics --- login is a program that local and remote connection mechanisms often invoke to facilitate logging into a Unix system. A vulnerability has been discovered in the login program for many System V-derived Unix implementations that allows unauthorized root access. More details can be found in CERT advisory CA-2001-34: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-34.html Silicon Graphics has investigated the issue and finds that IRIX 3.x may have had this issue, as mentioned in the CERT advisory. Any versions of IRIX that are more current than IRIX 3.x, including IRIX 4.x, IRIX 5.x, and IRIX 6.x, do NOT have this login vulnerability, and no further action is required. --- Information --- SGI Security Advisories can be found at: http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/ SGI Security Patches can be found at: http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/patches/ SGI patches for IRIX can be found at the following patch servers: http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/ SGI freeware updates for IRIX can be found at: http://freeware.sgi.com/ SGI fixes for SGI open sourced code can be found on: http://oss.sgi.com/projects/ SGI patches and RPMs for Linux can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/linux/ or http://oss.sgi.com/projects/sgilinux-combined/download/security-fixes/ SGI patches for Windows NT or 2000 can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/nt/ IRIX 5.2-6.4 Recommended/Required Patch Sets can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/patchset/ IRIX 6.5 Maintenance Release Streams can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html IRIX 6.5 Software Update CDs can be obtained from: http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/ The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches is patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/ For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirrors patches.sgi.com security FTP repository) lags behind and does not do a real-time update. --- Acknowledgments ---- SGI wishes to thank CERT and the Internet Community at large for their assistance in this matter. --- SGI Security Information/Contacts --- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to security-info@sgi.com. ------oOo------ SGI provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches is patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/ The SGI Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL: http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to security-info@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ SGI provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ SGI provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ . ------oOo------ If there are general security questions on SGI systems, email can be sent to security-info@sgi.com. For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBPB5xkrQ4cFApAP75AQFMHgP/buAaSamgTZbR0+2Sl6sYG+zCJPVKVEfJ MkcUazkgo/CKj7ULAFoPVVrxqUdxV8RVjkOt+ZR8qQOyKt7raMbYgPpZylwGznLO ZibZttb6CTc5hqz1hZaJj3BThRlSNb0ktlraEyac8rxF1/X43EMeAYEktT1QGjRw aLrAD3FWO1g= =a3UA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

Sun Affected

Updated:  December 17, 2001

Status

Affected

Vendor Statement

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Sun Microsystems, Inc. Security Bulletin Bulletin Number: #00213 Date: December 14, 2001 Cross-Ref: CERT Advisory CA-2001-34 Title: login The information contained in this Security Bulletin is provided "AS IS." Sun makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this Security Bulletin. ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED AND EXCLUDED TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW. IN NO EVENT WILL SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST REVENUE, PROFIT OR DATA, OR FOR DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES HOWEVER CAUSED AND REGARDLESS OF ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SECURITY BULLETIN, EVEN IF SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. If any of the above provisions are held to be in violation of applicable law, void, or unenforceable in any jurisdiction, then such provisions are waived to the extent necessary for this disclaimer to be otherwise enforceable in such jurisdiction. 1. Bulletins Topics Sun announces the release of patches for Solaris(tm) 8, 7, 2.6, and 2.5.1 (SunOS(tm) 5.8, 5.7, 5.6, and 5.5.1) which relate to a buffer overflow vulnerability in /bin/login. Sun recommends that you install the patches listed in section 4 immediately on systems running SunOS 5.8, 5.7, 5.6, and 5.5.1. 2. Who is Affected Vulnerable: SunOS 5.8, 5.8_x86, 5.7, 5.7_x86, 5.6, 5.6_x86, 5.5.1, and 5.5.1_x86 3. Understanding the Vulnerability The login command is used at the beginning of each terminal session to identify oneself to the system. login is invoked by the system when a connection is first established, after the previous user has terminated the login shell by issuing the exit command. A buffer overflow has been discovered in login which may be exploited by a local or a remote attacker to gain root access on the affected system. This issue was discovered by ISS X-Force who published an advisory at: http://xforce.iss.net/alerts/advise105.php CERT Advisory CA-2001-34 is available from: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-34.html 4. List of Patches A Sun Security Bulletin is usually issued after patches are available on SunSolve. In this case, while the patches are not yet available, they are in the process of being pushed to external servers and should be downloadable in a very short time. OS Version Patch ID SunOS 5.8 111085-02 SunOS 5.8_x86 111086-02 SunOS 5.7 112300-01 SunOS 5.7_x86 112301-01 SunOS 5.6 105665-04 SunOS 5.6_x86 105666-04 SunOS 5.5.1 106160-02 SunOS 5.5.1_x86 106161-02 APPENDICES A. Patches listed in this bulletin are available to all Sun customers at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/securitypatch B. Checksums for the patches listed in this bulletin are available at: ftp://sunsolve.sun.com/pub/patches/CHECKSUMS C. Sun security bulletins are available at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/security D. Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key is available at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pgpkey.txt E. To report or inquire about a security problem with Sun software, contact one or more of the following: - Your local Sun answer centers - Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT - Sun Security Coordination Team. Send email to: security-alert@sun.com F. To receive information or subscribe to our CWS (Customer Warning System) mailing list, send email to: security-alert@sun.com with a subject line (not body) containing one of the following commands: Command Information Returned/Action Taken help An explanation of how to get information key Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key list A list of current security topics query [topic] The email is treated as an inquiry and is forwarded to the Security Coordination Team report [topic] The email is treated as a security report and is forwarded to the Security Coordination Team. Please encrypt sensitive mail using Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key send topic A short status summary or bulletin. For example, to retrieve a Security Bulletin #00138, supply the following in the subject line (not body): send #138 subscribe Sender is added to our mailing list. To subscribe, supply the following in the subject line (not body): subscribe cws your-email-address Note that your-email-address should be substituted by your email address. unsubscribe Sender is removed from the CWS mailing list. Copyright 2001 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. Sun, Sun Microsystems, Solaris and SunOS are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and other countries. This Security Bulletin may be reproduced and distributed, provided that this Security Bulletin is not modified in any way and is attributed to Sun Microsystems, Inc. and provided that such reproduction and distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBPBqJ1bdzzzOFBFjJAQHlfQP/WCgq/w7hY7DDmIaq90/gWhy9JplNN574 9dpumknwt8SMK+COwq4sNe0JQj32/q70y2sUAxFjMg8z5TzuX8vhMl8w4TufxUJ5 x8iJ+yUcGZ2sYNbzz2Fz0ClI6H3lISXVhxyQPPHWm9qZdp6Ee9+fgwHqbal8lBt6 tAv+OoE1Fn4= =Lvzf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- To use our one-click unsubscribe facility, select the following URL: http://sunmail.sun.com/unsubscribe?6571575960901449

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

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