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Vulnerability Note VU#805915Oracle9i Application Server Apache PL/SQL module does not properly handle HTTP Authorization headerOverviewA vulnerability exists in the way the Apache Procedural Language/Structured Query Language (PL/SQL) module used by Oracle9i Application Server (iAS) handles HTTP Authorization headers. This vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to crash the Apache service.I. DescriptionNGSSoftware has released Insight Security Research Advisory #NISR06022002B that describes a number of vulnerabilities in the Apache PL/SQL module used by Oracle9i Application Server (iAS). This document addresses a denial-of-service vulnerability triggered by a malformed HTTP Authorization request.Oracle iAS uses the Apache HTTP Server to provide web services, including access to stored procedures via the Oracle PL/SQL module (modpplsql or mod_plsql). In iAS, PL/SQL is used to communicate with the database and generate HTML that can be interpreted by a web browser. The PL/SQL module handles authentication requests for various elements of Oracle iAS, such as stored procedures and Database Access Descriptors (DAD). If necessary, the PL/SQL module will prompt for credentials using the Authorization mechanism of the HTTP protocol. Section 14.8 of RFC 2616 describes HTTP Authorization and RFC 2617 describes the Basic and Digest HTTP Authentication schemes. Both server challenges and client requests use a token to determine what type of Authentication scheme (auth-scheme) to use. If the PL/SQL module receives a malformed HTTP Authorization request that does not contain an Authentication type (auth-scheme) token, the Apache process will crash, denying service to legitimate users. Apply the appropriate patch referenced in Oracle Security Alert #28.
References
The CERT Coordination Center thanks David Litchfield of NGSSoftware for information used in this document. This document was written by Art Manion.
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