OpenPKG Information for VU#897604

Sendmail address parsing buffer overflow

Status

Affected

Vendor Statement

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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@openpkg.org                         openpkg@openpkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-SA-2003.027                                       30-Mar-2003
________________________________________________________________________

Package:             sendmail
Vulnerability:       remote root exploit
OpenPKG Specific:    no

Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:          Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT      <= sendmail-8.12.8-20030328 >= sendmail-8.12.9-20030329
OpenPKG 1.2          <= sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.1    >= sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2
OpenPKG 1.1          none                        N.A.

Dependent Packages:  none

Description:
 Michal Zalewski discovered [1] a confirmed [2] buffer overflow
 vulnerability in all version of the Sendmail [0] MTA earlier than
 8.12.9. The mail address parser performs insufficient bounds checking
 in certain conditions due to a "char" to "int" data type conversion,
 making it possible for an attacker to take control of the application.
 Attackers may remotely exploit this vulnerability to gain "root"
 access of any vulnerable Sendmail server. The Common Vulnerabilities
 and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2003-0161 [3] to the
 problem.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm
 -q sendmail". If you have the "sendmail" package installed and its
 version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately
 upgrade it (see Solution). [4][5]

Solution:
 Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
 [6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7] or a mirror location,
 verify its integrity [8], build a corresponding binary RPM from it [4]
 and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [5].
 For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following operations
 to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust
 accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
 ftp> bin
 ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
 ftp> get sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
 ftp> bye
 $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
 $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
 $ su -
 # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2.*.rpm
________________________________________________________________________

References:
 [0] http://www.sendmail.org/
 [1] http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-March/008973.html
 [2] http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/316760/2003-03-26/2003-04-01/0
 [3] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0161
 [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
 [5] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
 [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
 [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
 [8] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
________________________________________________________________________

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Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Vendor References

None

Addendum

The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.

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