SGI Information for VU#274043

BSD Line Printer Daemon vulnerable to buffer overflow via crafted print request

Status

Affected

Vendor Statement

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

______________________________________________________________________________
SGI Security Advisory

Title: IRIX Printing System Vulnerabilities
Number: 20011003-01-P
Reference: CERTŪ Advisory CA-2001-15
Reference: ISS Advisory 20010619
Reference: CVE CAN-2001-0353
Date: October 31, 2001
______________________________________________________________________________

SGI provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its
consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. SGI recommends
that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

SGI provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis
only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied
or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability
or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall SGI be liable for
any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect,
special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising
from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions
or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________


- -----------------------
- --- Issue Specifics ---
- -----------------------

Issue #1: lpd

ISS X-Force has discovered a buffer overflow in BSD-based line
printer daemons (lpd) that may allow a remote or local attacker
to crash the daemon or execute arbitrary code with super user
privilege. Although lpd is part of the IRIX print.sw.bsdlpr
system and is not installed by default, if it is installed it
runs with root privileges by default on all current IRIX
versions.

Issue #2: lpsched

Last Stage of Delirium has reported vulnerabilities in the
lpsched program which allow remote attackers with sufficient
control of their remote network to obtain 'root' and 'lp'
privileges remotely. lpsched is installed by default on all
current IRIX versions.

Issue #3: lpstat

Last Stage of Delirium has reported a vulnerability in the
lpstat command in the way it loads and executes code from user
supplied net-type shared library objects. When appropriately
exploited it can lead to a local root compromise on a
vulnerable system. lpstat is installed by default on all
current IRIX versions.


- --------------
- --- Impact ---
- --------------

lpsched and lpstat are installed by default on IRIX.

lpd is part of the optional print.sw.bsdlpr subsystem and is not
installed by default on IRIX.

A local user account on the vulnerable system is not required
in order to exploit these vulnerabilities. Vulnerable systems
can be exploited remotely over an untrusted network.

These vulnerabilities can lead to a root compromise.

ISS X-Force reported the lpd vulnerability:
http://xforce.iss.net/alerts/advise80.php

The lpd vulnerability was also reported by CERTŪ Advisory CA-2001-15:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-15.html

The lpd vulnerability was assigned the following CVE:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0353

Last Stage of Delirium reported the lpstat and lpsched vulnerabilities:
http://www.lsd-pl.net/files/get?IRIX/irx_lpstat2
http://www.lsd-pl.net/files/get?IRIX/irx_lpsched
http://www.lsd-pl.net/files/get?IRIX/irx_lpsched2

These vulnerabilities have been publicly discussed in Usenet
newsgroups and security mailing lists.


- ----------------------
- --- Recommendation ---
- ----------------------

SGI has investigated the issues and recommends the following
steps for neutralizing the exposures. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI
systems. This issue has been corrected in future releases of
IRIX.


- --------------------------
- --- Temporary Solution ---
- --------------------------

Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.

The steps below can be used to remove the print.sw subsystems
to prevent exploitation of these vulnerabilities until patches
can be installed.


=================
**** WARNING ****
=================

These steps will disable printing capabilities.


1) Become the root user on the system.

% /bin/su -
Password:
#


2) Stop the printing services

# /etc/init.d/bsdlpr stop
# /etc/init.d/lp stop


3) Use the "versions" command to remove the printing
subsystems:

# versions remove print.sw.*


5) Return to previous level.

# exit
%

6) It is not necessary to reboot the system.


- ----------------
- --- Solution ---
- ----------------


OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------
IRIX 3.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 4.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 5.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.0.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.1 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.2 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.3 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.4 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.5 yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.1 yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.2m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.2f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.3m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.3f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.4m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.4f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.5m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.5f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.6m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.6f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.7m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.7f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.8m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.8f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.9m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.9f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.10m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.10f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.11m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.11f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.12m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.12f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.13m yes 4381 Note 3 & 4
IRIX 6.5.13f yes 4382 Note 3 & 5
IRIX 6.5.14m no
IRIX 6.5.14f no


NOTES

1) This version of the IRIX operating has been retired.
Upgrade to an actively supported IRIX operating system.
See http://support.sgi.com/irix/news/index.html#policy
for more information.

2) This version of the IRIX operating system is in maintenance mode.
Upgrade to an actively supported IRIX operating system.
See http://support.sgi.com/news/support/index.html for more
information.

3) See "Temporary Solution" section.


4) Download the IRIX 6.5.13 Maintenance Release Stream from the URL:
http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html

5) If you have not received an IRIX 6.5.13 CD for IRIX 6.5, contact your
SGI Support Provider or URL: http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/


Patches are available via the web, anonymous FTP and from your SGI
service/support provider.

SGI Security Advisories can be found at:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/

SGI Security Patches can be found at:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/patches/

SGI patches for IRIX can be found at the following patch servers:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/

SGI freeware updates for IRIX can be found at:
http://freeware.sgi.com/

SGI fixes for SGI open sourced code can be found on:
http://oss.sgi.com/projects/

SGI patches and RPMs for Linux can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/linux/ or
http://oss.sgi.com/projects/sgilinux-combined/download/security-fixes/

SGI patches for Windows NT or 2000 can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/nt/

IRIX 5.2-6.4 Recommended/Required Patch Sets can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/patchset/

IRIX 6.5 Maintenance Release Streams can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html

IRIX 6.5 Software Update CDs can be obtained from:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches
is patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches
are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/

For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirrors
patches.sgi.com security FTP repository) lags behind and does not
do a real-time update.


##### Patch File Checksums ####

The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:

Filename: README.patch.4381
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10847 10 README.patch.4381
Algorithm #2 (sum): 42018 10 README.patch.4381
MD5 checksum: 7C29B82B034E4BDF9C30395ED4654C1F

Filename: patchSG0004381
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 14603 8 patchSG0004381
Algorithm #2 (sum): 42286 8 patchSG0004381
MD5 checksum: A285EC4339BACE5237041B9BAB30234F

Filename: patchSG0004381.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32530 10 patchSG0004381.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 5594 10 patchSG0004381.idb
MD5 checksum: BE0CBA67C72C20D4E654E6E4E8B6AAA9

Filename: patchSG0004381.print_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 64956 1646 patchSG0004381.print_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 22067 1646 patchSG0004381.print_sw
MD5 checksum: AF14FA2E67DECC6125B2003563671E1F


Filename: README.patch.4382
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40351 10 README.patch.4382
Algorithm #2 (sum): 41404 10 README.patch.4382
MD5 checksum: FAACCCD66DDF89F458D3B8E1711A07AE

Filename: patchSG0004382
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 00905 7 patchSG0004382
Algorithm #2 (sum): 14079 7 patchSG0004382
MD5 checksum: A1CBC07679FD1B4997B44F07ED8D995F

Filename: patchSG0004382.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 27746 10 patchSG0004382.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 5562 10 patchSG0004382.idb
MD5 checksum: A7268E9BA48D5C1824F33212DFEAE1E5

Filename: patchSG0004382.print_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 58752 1650 patchSG0004382.print_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 65465 1650 patchSG0004382.print_sw
MD5 checksum: 2FF6D7220C752471C6AF722E3600AF8C


- ------------------------
- --- Acknowledgments ----
- ------------------------

SGI wishes to thank Last Stage of Delirium, ISS X-Force,
CERT Coordination Center and the users of the Internet
Community at large for their assistance in this matter.


- -----------------------------------------
- --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
- -----------------------------------------

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.

------oOo------

SGI provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI
community. This information is freely available to any person needing
the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web.

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches
is patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches
are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/

The SGI Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/

For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.

------oOo------

SGI provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and
encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all
SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing
list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/support/security/wiretap.html)
or by sending email to SGI as outlined below.

% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d

In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.


------oOo------

SGI provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is
located at http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ .

------oOo------

If there are general security questions on SGI systems, email can be
sent to security-info@sgi.com.

For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.

______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties
and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any
way, SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.



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Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Vendor References

None

Addendum

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