Vulnerability Note VU#520721

Oracle Outside In is a set of libraries that can decode over 500 different file formats. Originally written by Stellent, Outside In is now part of Oracle. The Oracle Outside In libraries are used by a variety of applications, including Oracle Fusion Middleware, Guidance Encase Forensics, AccessData FTK, and Novell Groupwise.

Outside In fails to properly handle Lotus 123 and Microsoft CAB file data, which are handled on the Windows platform by the libraries vswk6.dll and sccut.dll, respectively. The Linux version of Outside In uses libvs_wk6.so and libsc_ut.so. Other supported platforms may use different file names.The CAB file parser may be used when handling a variety of file formats, including Microsoft OneNote (.onepkg).

Limited testing has shown that the Lotus 123 parser in Outside In versions 8.1.0.4037 through 8.3.5.5684 are vulnerable. Previous versions may also be affected. The CAB file identification vulnerability appears to only affect 8.3.5.x versions through 8.3.5.5684.

By causing an application to process a specially-crafted file with the Oracle Outside In library, a remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the vulnerable application. Depending on what application is using Outside In, this may happen as the result of some user interaction, such as single-clicking on a file, or it may happen with no user interaction at all.

Apply an update

These vulnerabilites are addressed in the Oracle Fusion Middleware Critical Patch Update April 2011. This update provides updated libraries with versions 8.3.5.5927 and 8.3.2.5927, for the Outside in 8.3.5 and 8.3.2 product lines, respectively. Please see Oracle Support Note 1291877.1 (valid Oracle CSI# required) for more details. If you are using an application that uses Outside In, please check with that application's vendor for updates. If updates for your application are not yet available, or if you wish to mitigate other vulnerabilities in Outside In, please consider the following workarounds:

Use the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit

The Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to help prevent exploitation of this and other vulnerabilities.

Enable DEP in Microsoft Windows

Consider enabling Data Execution Prevention (DEP) in supported versions of Windows. DEP should not be treated as a complete workaround, but it can mitigate the execution of attacker-supplied code in some cases. Microsoft has published detailed technical information about DEP in Security Research & Defense blog posts "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology" part 1 and part 2. DEP should be used in conjunction with the application of patches or other mitigations described in this document.

Note that when relying on DEP for exploit mitigation, it is important to use a system that supports Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) as well. ASLR is not supported by Windows XP or Windows Server 2003 or earlier. ASLR was introduced with Microsoft Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008. Please see the Microsoft SRD blog entry: On the effectiveness of DEP and ASLR for more details.