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Fortigate UTM appliances share the same default CA certificate

Vulnerability Note VU#111708

Original Release Date: 2012-11-02 | Last Revised: 2012-11-02

Overview

Fortigate UTM appliances that support SSL/TLS deep packet inspection share the same self-signed Fortigate CA certificate and associated private key across all devices. The private key, which has been compromised, allows attackers to create and sign fake certificates.

Description

Fortigate UTM appliances share the same self-signed Fortigate CA certificate. Companies that use these appliances for deep packet inspection will have most likely deployed the CA certificate to endpoint web browsers so certificate warnings will not be seen by an end-user. Since the associated private key has been compromised (published on the web), an attacker with a man-in-the-middle vantage point on the network will be able to simulate the behavior of the Fortigate appliance and eavesdrop on encrypted communications or spoof websites. Also, the attacker may digitally sign malicious software, spoofing the identity of the publisher.

Impact

Primarily at risk are users who have imported the compromised Fortigate CA certificate into their web browser or operating system. This risk applies equally within the company (connected to a network behind the Fortigate UTM appliance) as anywhere else. An attacker with a man-in-the-middle vantage point on the current network may be able to eavesdrop on encrypted communications. In addition, an attacker may falsify digital signatures such as Authenticode.

Solution

Install a new CA certificate

The vendor recommends the following steps be taken to address this vulnerability.

    1. Admin creates/obtains a CA certificate for which only they have the private key.
    2. Admin installs the CA certificate on FortiGate.
    3. Admin uses "set caname xxx" to select that certificate for SSL deep inspection.
    Disable the Fortigate CA certificate

    Endpoints should not trust the self-signed Fortigate CA certificate. The following certificate information is for the certificate that should be distrusted:

    Subject: "E = support@fortinet.com; CN = FortiGate CA; OU = Certificate Authority; O = Fortinet; L = Sunnyvale; S = California; C = US";
    Thumbprint: 3e 20 7f 9a 6b d9 5c 7c 2b 89 11 67 d3 2f 57 87 2f 76 60 14

    The preferrable way to distrust a CA certificate is to import it to the "Untrusted certificates" branch of the system certificate store. To continue the use of SSL/TLS deep packet inspection, a new, unique, CA certificate may be generated and imported into the Fortigate UTM appliance. To prevent users from experiencing certificate errors, that new CA certificate can be imported into web browsers. Chapter 6 of the FortiOS handbook contains instructions on how to replace the default CA certificate.

    Vendor Information

    111708
    Expand all

    Fortinet, Inc.

    Notified:  September 07, 2012 Updated:  October 30, 2012

    Status

      Affected

    Vendor Statement

    No statement is currently available from the vendor regarding this vulnerability.

    Vendor Information

    We are not aware of further vendor information regarding this vulnerability.

    Addendum

    There are no additional comments at this time.

    If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.


    CVSS Metrics

    Group Score Vector
    Base 4.6 AV:A/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:N/A:N
    Temporal 3.7 E:F/RL:W/RC:UC
    Environmental 3.7 CDP:ND/TD:ND/CR:ND/IR:ND/AR:ND

    References

    Credit

    Thanks to Bitwiper for reporting this vulnerability.

    This document was written by Jared Allar.

    Other Information

    CVE IDs: CVE-2012-4948
    Date Public: 2012-10-22
    Date First Published: 2012-11-02
    Date Last Updated: 2012-11-02 20:45 UTC
    Document Revision: 19

    Sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Cybersecurity and Communications.