Vulnerability Note VU#384230
Cisco IOS fails to properly handle telnet connections
A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in Cisco's Internetwork Operating System (IOS). This vulnerability could allow remote attackers to prevent new connections to remote management services on a vulnerable device.
An unauthenticated, remote attacker with the ability to send TCP packets to ports used by the telnet (23/tcp) or reverse telnet (2001-2999/tcp, 3001-3099/tcp, 6001-6999/tcp, 7001-7099/tcp) service could cause a vulnerable device to refuse subsequent connections to the SSH, SCP, RSH, telnet, reverse telnet, and HTTP remote management services. Exploitation of this vulnerability could deny remote access to the device. Existing connections to these services are not affected.
Until patches are available to address this issue, Cisco recommends the following workarounds to mitigate this vulnerability.
To disable telnet access to the device, configure the following on all your VTY lines:
Router(config-line)# transport input ssh
Note: Even if SSH is enabled, the IOS device is not protected until telnet access is disabled.
Configuring a VTY Access Class
It is possible to limit the exposure of the Cisco device by applying a VTY access class to permit only known, trusted devices to connect to the device via telnet, reverse telnet, RSH, SSH, or SCP.
For more information on restricting traffic to VTYs, please consult the following document:
Configuring Interface Access Lists (ACLs)
In addition to configuring a VTY access class, it may be desirable to block all telnet traffic from entering the network. The example below demonstrates how to block TCP port 23 and the reverse telnet traffic while permitting all other IP traffic:
Router(config)# access-list 100 deny tcp any any range 2001 2999
Router(config)# access-list 100 deny tcp any any range 3001 3099
Router(config)# access-list 100 deny tcp any any range 6001 6999
Router(config)# access-list 100 deny tcp any any range 7001 7099
Router(config)# access-list 100 permit ip any any
The access list must then be configured to block inbound traffic on all public-facing interfaces:
Router(config-if)# ip access-group 100 in
Telnet should be blocked as part of a Transit ACL controlling all access to the trusted network. Transit ACLs are considered a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security, as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The white paper entitled "Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for transit ACLs:
Configuring Infrastructure Access Lists (iACLs)
Although it is often difficult to block traffic traversing your network, it is possible to identify traffic that should never be allowed to target your infrastructure devices and block that traffic at the border of your network. Infrastructure ACLs are considered a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security, as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The white paper entitled "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for infrastructure protection ACLs:
Configuring Receive Access Lists (rACLs)
For distributed platforms, rACLs may be an option starting in Cisco IOS Software Versions 12.0(21)S2 for the 12000 series GSR and 12.0(24)S for the 7500 series. The receive access lists protect the device from harmful traffic before the traffic can impact the route processor. Receive path ACLs are considered a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security, as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The CPU load is distributed to the line card processors and helps mitigate load on the main route processor. The white paper entitled "GSR: Receive Access Control Lists" will help identify and allow legitimate traffic to your device and deny all unwanted packets:
Clearing TCP Connections Using the IOS CLI
The who command will show VTY connections to the device:
Line User Host(s) Idle Location
0 con 0 192.168.10.72 00:00:00
* 2 vty 0 idle 00:00:00 192.168.10.72
3 vty 1 idle 00:00:04 192.168.10.10
The above shows two connections on VTYs, one from 192.168.10.72, and one from 192.168.10.10. The * indicates which VTY belongs to the current session. In the above example, the user issuing the who command was connecting from 192.168.10.72. To clear the session from 192.168.10.10, which is on VTY 1, the following command is used:
Router# clear tcp line vty 1
Note: If you are using telnet to connect to the device, accidentally clearing your TCP connection will disconnect your telnet session. If the IOS device has been exploited, it will not be possible to reconnect via telnet. Console access or a device reload will be required to restore service.
Systems Affected (Learn More)
|Vendor||Status||Date Notified||Date Updated|
|Cisco Systems Inc.||Affected||-||27 Aug 2004|
CVSS Metrics (Learn More)
This vulnerability was reported by the Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team ( PSIRT ) .
This document was written by Damon Morda based on information provided by Cisco.
- CVE IDs: Unknown
- Date Public: 27 Aug 2004
- Date First Published: 27 Aug 2004
- Date Last Updated: 03 Sep 2004
- Severity Metric: 31.50
- Document Revision: 46
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