The Seagate Crystal Reports product exposes passwords to back-end databases in certain configurations. In particular, the username and password are transmitted in plaintext from the client browser to the server as part of the URL when using technologies other than Active Server Pages (ASP).
Here's an example situation in which a Seagate Crystal Reports (SCR) system could be vulnerable:
A developer has a database that they want to access using Seagate Crystal Reports, but they do not want everyone to have access to this database. So they password protect the database, and attempt to force all access through the Seagate Crystal Reports (SCR) product. Unfortunately, the only way for the Seagate product to gain access to the database is by embedding the password in the HTML page for the web report.
An attacker who is able to obtain the userid and password from a URL or an HTML file may be able to gain access to the back-end database.
Do not use Seagate Crystal Reports to access databases with strong security requirements.
If you must access databases with security requirement, you should employ as many of the following techniques as possible:
Even in the presence of all these precautions, you may not be safe from all variations of this vulnerability.
Thanks to Kevin Dean for reporting this vulnerability to the CERT/CC, as well as his patience and assistance in preparing this document.
This document was written by Cory F Cohen.
|Date First Published:||2001-01-10|
|Date Last Updated:||2001-01-10 23:18 UTC|