Microsoft Windows 8 introduced a change in how system-wide mandatory ASLR is implemented. This change requires system-wide bottom-up ASLR to be enabled for mandatory ASLR to receive entropy. Tools that enable system-wide ASLR without also setting bottom-up ASLR will fail to properly randomize executables that do not opt in to ASLR.
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
Starting with Windows Vista, a feature called ASLR was introduced to Windows that helps prevent code-reuse attacks. By loading executable modules at non-predictable addresses, Windows can help to mitigate attacks that rely on code being at predictable locations. Return-oriented programming (ROP) is an exploit technique that relies on code that is loaded to a predictable or discoverable location. One weakness with the implementation of ASLR is that it requires that the code is linked with the /DYNAMICBASE flag to opt in to ASLR.
Windows 8 and newer systems that have system-wide ASLR enabled via EMET or Windows Defender Exploit Guard will have non-DYNAMICBASE applications relocated to a predictable location, thus voiding any benefit of mandatory ASLR. This can make exploitation of some classes of vulnerabilities easier.
The CERT/CC is currently unaware of a practical solution to this problem. Please consider the following workaround:
Enable system-wide bottom-up ASLR on systems that have system-wide mandatory ASLR
This issue was reported by Will Dormann of the CERT/CC, with assistance from Matt Miller of Microsoft.
|Date First Published:||2017-11-17|
|Date Last Updated:||2017-11-20 03:07 UTC|