NetBSD Information for VU#539363
State-based firewalls fail to effectively manage session table resource exhaustion
TCP SYN Flood
IPFilter is not vulnerable to this attack as it already implements aggressive flushing of the state table when it detects it to be full.
There is no specific attack here that IPFilter needs to defend against. It will time things out according to timeouts set for UDP (can be done
on a per-rule basis.)
Crikey CRC Flood
IPFilter does not currently allow packets to be rejected because of bad CRC's but the problem posed here is dealt with in the two aforementioned
IPFilter supports the use of separate timeout values for initial sessions and allows connection tracking to be disabled.
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
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