Software Engineering Institute

Vendor Statement

We have not received a statement from the vendor.

References

• http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20051116-7920.shtml

Statement Date:   December 07, 2010

Vendor Statement

We have not received a statement from the vendor.

CERT Addendum

The release notes for SoundPoint IP/SoundStation IP SIP software states that version 3.1.2 has closed the debug port. "47450: Port 17185 is open, presenting a security risk" http://downloads.polycom.com/voice/voip/relnotes/spip_ssip_v3_1_6_Legacy_release_notes.pdf

Statement Date:   June 29, 2010

Vendor Statement

We have not received a statement from the vendor.

References

• http://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/cgi-bin/rockwellautomation.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=69735

CERT Addendum

Rockwell Automation 1756-ENBT series A running firmware versions 3.2.6 and 3.6.1 are vulnerable. Please see Rockwell Automation Technote 69735 for more information.

Vendor Statement

We have not received a statement from the vendor.

CERT Addendum

newsoft reports that the SFR (formerly Neuf Cegetel and Neuf Telecom) Trio3C has the debug service enabled.

Vendor Statement

We have not received a statement from the vendor.

CERT Addendum

The Modicon M340 with firmware version 2.5 was reported to run VxWorks 6.4 and have the debug port enabled.

Vendor Statement

Security Advisory Report - OBSO-1010-01 Enabled VxWorks debug service Creation Date: 2010-10-15 Last Update: 2010-10-15 Summary A security researcher has identified a large number of products based on the VxWorks platform provided by Wind River Systems with a debug service enabled by default at port 17185/udp. Vulnerability Details The debug service provides full access to the memory of an affected device and allows for memory to be written as well as functions to be called. Of the various products based on VxWorks, the following are not affected by this vulnerability: HiPath Wireless Convergence, RG 8700, optiPoint 410/420 SIP and HFA (V5). Affected Products HiPath 3000 (HG 1500 Gateway) HiPath 4000 (HG 35xx Gateway) optiPoint 410/420 HFA, versions before V5 optiPoint 600 office Recommended Actions In general, it is recommended not to attach the mentioned systems directly at the internet. Appropriate firewall rules should be implemented to restrict access to the debug service (17185/udp). The problem is solved in the following versions; an update to these or higher versions is highly recommended: HiPath 3000 V8: V8 R5.2.0 HiPath 4000 V4: V4 R4.1.12 HiPath 4000 V5: V5 R1.2.4 Please note: HiPath 3000 V7: You need to upgrade the HG 1500 gateway only. Please use V8 R5.2.0 for this. You may keep the system itself in V7. HiPath 3000 V6 and earlier have reached end of SW support; please consider an upgrade to V7 or V8 HiPath 4000 V3 and earlier have reached end of SW support; please consider an upgrade to V4 or higher. Some older, unsupported versions of optiPoint 410/420 HFA IP phones are also vulnerable. Please ensure, that V5 is installed on all phones. optiPoint 600 office has reached end of life since a few years already; an update is unfortunately not available References http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-2965 http://blog.metasploit.com/2010/08/vxworks-vulnerabilities.html http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/362332 Revision History 2010-10-15 Initial release Contact and Disclaimer OpenScale Baseline Security Office obso@siemens-enterprise.com © Siemens Enterprise Communications GmbH & Co KG 2010 Siemens Enterprise Communications GmbH & Co. KG is a Trademark Licensee of Siemens AG The information provided in this document is subject to change without notice. Siemens Enterpise Communications GmbH & Co KG (SEN) assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document, and it does not affect your current support agreements with SEN. Any trademarks referenced in this document are the property of their respective owners. ---End Vendor Statement-------------------------------------------------------------------

CERT Addendum

The vendor provided the above advisory information for their affected products.

Vendor Statement

Wind River has analyzed VU#362332, and determined that all versions of VxWorks could be vulnerable if the WDB agent is left enabled in production systems and the system is network attached. VxWorks has a very strong track record of offering secure products and Wind River is committed to active threat monitoring, rapid assessment, threat prioritization, expedited remediation, response and proactive customer contact. Customers are encouraged to follow the remediation actions outlined in the SOLUTION section of the vulnerability post. Registered users can access Wind River's online support for more information by following this link: https://support.windriver.com/olsPortal/faces/maintenance/downloadDetails.jspx?contentId=033708 Or contact Wind River technical support for more information: http://windriver.com/support/

CERT Addendum

Within the VxWorks Kernel programmers guide it states: “For production systems, you will want to reconfigure VxWorks with only those components needed for deployed operation, and to build it as the appropriate type of system image. You will likely want to remove components required for host development support, such as the WDB target agent and debugging components (INCLUDE_WDB and INCLUDE_DEBUG), as well as to remove any other operating system components not required to support your application. Other considerations may include reducing the memory requirements of the system, speeding up boot time, and security issues.”